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Research in recent decades has shown that an analysis of underground economy from the limiting perspective of 
economic factors of influence is insufficient. Through an integrative approach it is opened the way to a 
multidisciplinary and multi causal understanding of all factors (economic, noneconomic, quasi economic) that 
influence the phenomenon of underground economy. The present work pleads for the analysis of the concept 
underground economy (multidimensional and composite) through the instruments of study: the choices, 
institutions and direct democracy. The model of choices express the decision of labor force to activate on the 
official labor market or to the illegal labor market in the context given by opportunities, preferences and 
constraints. Institutions defines the capacity of regulation and implementation of government policies with 
implications in stimulating or discouraging economic subjects to hide activities in the sphere of underground 
economy. Direct democracy through its institutions (referendums, legislative initiatives) provides the political 
framework for the active involvement of the taxpayer as a voter or elector to a healthy and sustainable economic 
development. The results of active involvement of citizens consist in a more effective implementation of strategies 
and tax policies and a reduction of incentives to escape in the sphere of economic informality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The right to existence of the underground economy as a sub branch of economic science is the result of 
multiple attempts of conceptualizing and theorizing. Definition of the underground economy is based on illicit 
economic activities and is performed by various tools - analysis criteria such as: "official economy (-nonofficial 
economy), legal (-illegal), commercial (-noncommercial), monetary (-nonmonetary), declared (-undeclared), 
production (-transfer), economic-statistic, registered (-unregistered), exhaustive (-nonexhaustive), intention (-
nonintention), reply (-nonreply), market economy (-domestic economy)" (Baicu, 2014, p.32). Through the 
underground economy we understand "all economic activities undeclared to institutions involved in the 
assessment of taxes and social contributions, which escapes statistical records and the national accounts” 
(Angelescu, Ciucur et al, 2001, p. 183). 
An integrative perspective and a detailed analysis of the morphology of the underground economy cannot 
be done without analyzing all the factors that generate this phenomenon. Consideration of quasi economic 
factors such as elections, institutions and direct democracy is one of the ways most relevant to understand the 
size of the underground sector. 
Understanding of the behaviour of the taxpayer in relation with the state, integrative and interdisciplinary 
approach constitutes a premise for understanding serious underground sector (Baicu and Hapenciuc, 2015). The 
perspective on the underground economy in the context of vector analysis: choices, institutions and direct 
democracy is the best pretext to analyze of this study 
The present work falls into the category of conceptual research combining aspects of deductive nature 
with those of inductive deductive nature having as background the controversial relationship between quasi 
economic factors and underground economy. The paper is structured on three quasi economics factors: 1. 
choices factor stresses the importance of choices model and decisions of the supply of labour force to act in 
formal or informal sector; 2. The institutions factor express the role of strong institutions in discouraging 
underground activities; 3. The direct democracy factor shows the importance of taxpayer involvement in 
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II. THE MODEL CHOICE  
The economy studies how individuals, businesses, government and other organizations in society make 
choices and how those choices determine the use of society's resources (Stiglitz and Walsh, 2005). The choices, 
according to Stiglitz and Walsh are analyzed in area described by these concepts: compromises, incentives, 
exchange, information and distribution. The economic analysis of any choices requires, for any rational people 
or company, identifying the set of opportunities. Defining the limits used by each actor of economic life is an 
important step in an exhaustive analysis of choices. The set of opportunities is defined by the relationship 
constraints-choices as meaning that constraints limit choices. The constraints that limit the choices of individuals 
and companies are time and money. The constraints of budget express the set of opportunities whose constraints 
are imposed by money. The time constraints express the set of opportunities whose constraints are imposed by 
time. Summarizing the above ideas can be argued that the money (incomes), and the activities are opportunities 
for both formal and informal activities. 
Paradigm choices - set of opportunities - constraints (budget + time) indicates a valid mechanism of 
operating in the visible (official) economy, the same mechanism raises questions regarding the choice of 
informal economy and will be a pretext of analysis in this section. In the official economy or visible some 
researchers, in order to understand the motivation of the workforce, are using the basic model of choice (Stiglitz 
and Walsh, 2005) or the neoclassical model incomes - leisure (Schneider and Enste, 2013) where the time 
allocation for each person is a given objective. Both models use as analysis tools the constraint budget or budget 
line and indifference curves.  
Within basic models, alternatives or extra time options or illicit work are ignored or not provided in the 
analysis. The starting points in analyzing the underlying models assume that the individual has only one 
occupation and is not working in the underground economy. Unfortunately these assumptions are not consistent 
with the reality of the labour market.  From an economic perspective free time is defined as the time in which 
the individual could to work (in the official economy) to earn an income, but that is not spent working. As a 
result a person receives a higher income if is giving up to its free time. Individuals are willing to give up some 
free time for a revenue growth. Indifference curves (curves isoutility) express within basic models all 
combinations income (salary) - free time from the individual (actor, interpreter of both formal and informal 
economy roles) hopes to achieve the same level of satisfaction. In other words, preferences for income-leisure 
combinations are represented by indifference curves and answer the question "what the labor market actors 
want?". In the chart income-free time (figure 1), individual system of preferences is represented by a number of 
indifference curves, theoretically infinite. Budget line expresses achievable income when work or at leisure time 





















Figure 1. Indifference curves and choices leisure-income 
Source (Joseph E. Stiglitz, Carl E. Walsh, 2005, p.191) 
 
 
 The problem on which the budget line is responding is constraint and it is characterised by the question 
"what can the labour market actors? ". The total of one man choices is defined by budgetary constraints. The 
equilibrium point of the labour market actor unveil election of optimal allocation of free time, default work time, 
and answer the question "what do the actors of labour market?". The slope of budget constraint is given by wage 
level. The slope of indifference curve is the marginal rate of substitution between leisure time and income 
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(wages) and measures the amount of income that the individual requires to compensate for giving up to another 
hour of free time. 
To maximize the total utility, individuals will choose, at some point, the optimal combination that will 
satisfy their desires (preferences) and opportunities. From geometrically point of vue, this will occur where 
preferences, described by indifference curves map, will meet the possibilities described by budget line. Junction 
point where it will perform is so called the equilibrium point.The equilibrium point is reached where one of 
indifference curves is tangent to the budget line. In point of contact both curves have the same slope, meaning 
that marginal rate of substitution is equalising the wage. According to Schneider and Enste, point of tangency 
expresses the optimal allocation of time, understanding by this an efficient allocation of work time and free time 
(Schneider and Enste, 2013). Isachsen and Strom tried to explain the underground economy by using the concept 
of optimizing of the time allocated together with theories of tax evasion (Isachsen and Strom, 1980). According 
to these authors: individuals divides their time into three segments, for official working time, informally working 
time and leisure; tax evasion is specific to unofficial working time; a higher marginal tax rate leads to a decrease 
of labour supply on the official market; marginal tax burden increases the underground economy. 
Decision of labour to work or no work can be analysed and through paradigm {choices - set of 
opportunities - constraints (budget + time) - compromises}. As in the case of nonclasic model, the analysis tools 
are targeting binomial (leisure / official working time) - (income / salary). Entering into the equation of a third 
element, unofficial working time or illicit working time opens possibilities of combining of their analysis, thus 
illustrating the practical and real labour market. Possibilities of combining reflects, in our opinion, in another 
manner the mechanism choices - set of opportunities- constraints, adapted to conditions created by the illicit 
working time and by informal sector or underground economy. 
III. INSTITUTIONS  
In some working papers are analyzed the etiological factors of the underground economy through the decisive 
role of institutions and rule of law. We see that companies facing with - onerous regulations, inconsistent 
application of the law and, especially, corruption - identifies an additional incentive to conceal their activities in 
the underground economy. Some empirical analysis suggests that institutions are a key determinant of the 
underground economy even more important than tax rates. Global growth of public protests against perceptions 
of poor governance and lack of sustainable growth is an opportunity for reflection on the need to develop strong 
institutions. The effects of a healthy consolidation of institutions are reflected in the extension of formal 
economy benefits, encourage of economic growth and increase of business opportunities. High underground 
savings raise problems on developing economic and social policies being the source which triggers a vicious 
circle, governments with informal economies or high underground levels can raise tax rates to earn, thus 
encouraging the extension, sometimes alarming, of the underground economy. This can erode the institutional 
capacity of government and the state seen on a global dimension. However there is a positive side, a large 
informal sector can be regarded as a "nursery" for future economic growth in the formal economy (Singh, Jain-
Chandra et. al, 2012). This is particularly important when it is analyzed from a development perspective; we 
should not forget that poor countries and developing countries have much bigger share of the informal sector 
than rich countries. To the legitimate question - what is the connection between underdevelopment and the 
underground economy? - some researchers have introduced in response equation, the role of institutions. Thus, 
de soto links the issue of underdevelopment of institutional weakness claiming that much of the capital 
productive potential of poor countries is outside the formal system of property rights (de soto, 2000). In countries 
with mature systems of property rights, capital can be used as a lever for production activity. The same cannot be 
said of poor countries, where it is often very difficult to establish clear property rights and capital cannot be used 
as an effective tool for production activity. Therefore, the productive capacity of the economy is limited because 
of the institutional weaknesses, the formal economy is hampered to a natural development, encouraging the 
informalisation of the economy by enclavisation with a small number of beneficiaries (benefits) and many are 
left outside the official or regulated framework. As such, it requires the establishment of institutions that protect 
the property rights to unlock the growth potential included in the informal sector. 
The empirical analysis concerns the relationship between economy and institutions carried out by anoop 
singh, sonali jain-chandra and adil mohommad for the imf - which uses data from about 100 countries and 
includes developed emerging and developing countries - led to the following interesting conclusions: a) it was 
observed that the underground economy is influenced mainly by the quality of institutions; b) it was found that 
the share of national income in underground economy is even greater as there is more corruption and rule of law 
is weak (singh, jain-chandra et. Al, 2012). 
Better institutions are associated with a significantly smaller economy. In addition, social, political, 
economic institutions may, directly or indirectly, generate a conducive framework to the development of the 
informal sector. Regulatory burden faced by workers and firms is an important factor and determines the size of 
the underground economy. Regulatory burden (meaning excessive or ambiguous tax laws) include costs related 
to taxes, administration, work and increase costs for businesses and encourage the transition to the underground 
economy. A greater regulation is correlated with a larger shadow economy. An aggravation of the regulation 
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index (Heritage Foundation) witih one point is associated with a 12 percent increase in the size of the 
underground economy (Friedman, Johnson et. al, 2000). 
According to Aruoba, good institutions are associated with lower inflation, higher taxes and smaller 
informal sectors (Aruoba, 2010). Therefore, high taxes (coupled with higher inflation) are associated with large 
informal sectors (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Relationship informal sector – total tax rate (in the institutional context) 
Source (S. Boragan Aruoba, 2010, p. 46) 
 
People engage themselves in underground economic activities for various reasons; the most important are 
government actions, especially in terms of taxation and regulation. Regarding institutions and government 
actions, some authors believe that it is possible, for highly developed countries, as a government not to have a 
strong interest in reducing the gray economy due to: “at least 2/3 of the income earned in the shadow economy is 
immediately spent in the official economy; as income earned in the shadow economy increases the standard of 
living of 1/3 of the working population; between 40 and 50% of shadow economy activities have a 
complementary character, which means that additional value added is created, and this increases the overall GDP 
with both components official and unofficial; people working in the shadow economy have less time for other 
things like going to demonstrations, strikes etc; Schneider (2010, p. 457). 
Therefore, it is necessary to undertake effective measures to make work in the informal economy less 
attractive and equipping responsible public institutions to counterbalance effectively the populist and selfish 
actions of politicians. 
IV.  DIRECT DEMOCRACY  
The development of the informal sector can be seen as a consequence of the failure of democracy in its 
various forms. To support an efficient market economy requires a strong democracy in order to provide optimal 
public goods and services to taxpayers, citizens or companies. This scenario of failure of democracy, generator 
of informality, takes shape when the government is wasteful, corrupt and exercise discretion in allocating 
resources. The citizens who feel burdened by the state will choose "exit option" from the the formal sector and 
decide to work in the informal sector in response to the precarious democratic and ineffective government. 
Institutions of direct democracy have the ability to endow citizens with "voice option" to impose performance 
achievement by the government. In other words, direct democracy is a way to get people out of social and 
economic isolation caused, most often, by the behaviour of politicians. Increasing of resistance to economic rules 
and regulations, to institutions that implement and politicians that concept them manifests itself by increasing the 
role of the nefarious hidden economy. Starting from the formal framework of direct democracy, underground 
phenomenon can be reduced by applying a strategy based on two pillars: a) less attractive, output option -exit 
options (exit of the underground economy); b) strengthening the voice option-voice option (voting and 
participation) (Enste, 2015). In this model instrument forms of direct democracy - such as referendums and 
legislative initiatives should be introduced to provide taxpayers with more leverage to participate in making 
decisions aimed at political, social or fiscal aspects. 
Various forms of democratic participation can have as result: decrease the perception of imposition of 
restrictions on personal freedom, stimulating tax morality, civic consciousness, reducing the attractiveness of the 
informal economy. 
The role of direct democracy in the evolution of the shadow economy can be seen through the concepts of 
constitutionality, democratic system and democratic participation. In this sense, Rivera-Batiz highlighted the 
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importance of the democratic system in that democracy promotes the formal economy, particularly in less 
corruption, and implicitly, contribute to the reduction of the underground economy on the other hand (Rivera-
Batiz, 2002). Aragones and Sanchez-Pages argue that a more consistent democratic participation could influence 
the economy, its impact downwards (Aragones and Sanchez-Pages, 2009). They bring as argument the example 
of Porto Allegre City in Brazil where voters were actively involved in the processes of proposal, decision and 
implementation of public policy. Teobaldeli and Schneider described a model linking the direct democracy of 
the underground economy through fiscal policy choices made by elected politicians (Teobaldeli and Schneider, 
2013).The model shows that more direct democracy favours the implementation of fiscal policies closer to 
citizens' preferences, thus reducing incentives of individuals to operate informally. 
Institutions of direct democracy interact with another feature of the political system, such as the size of 
the electoral constituency. Direct democracy is expected to have a greater effect in reducing the underground 
economy, when the electoral system is characterized by a magnitude (when there are several legislators or 
elected representatives) of the higher constituency. Research in this area suggests that effects of direct 
democracy institutions on the underground economy is negative, nonlinear, and the results depend on the 
interaction between direct democracy and the size of the constituency (Teobaldeli and Schneider, 2013). 
In literature the relationship direct democracy - economy (underground) is analyzed from the perspective 
of a set of control variables: direct democracy index (Fiorino and Ricciuti, 2007); magnitude / size of 
constituency (Persson and Tabellini 2002); democracy age (years of uninterrupted democratic governance); the 
quality of democracy; size of the country; federal structure (Dell'Anno and Teobaldelli, 2012); ethno-linguistic 
fractionation (Alesina, Devleeschauwer et. al, 2003); GDP per capita; index of regulatory burden; the size of 
government; composition of public spending.  
If we should express synthetically, we can conclude that, direct democracy has a negative effect, 
importantly, on the level of activity of economy, this effect is nonlinear and depends also on the magnitude / size 
of the district /constituency (the number of legislators / deputies / counsellors elected in a constituency / district). 
V.  CONCLUSIONS  
To reveal the complexity of economic informality are needed multidimensional and pluricauzale 
approaches of underground economy that addresses both economic and non-economic issues. 
The choices model shows that the mechanism of decision taking of labor supply offer and preferences to 
operate in the informal sector should take into account: a) segmentation of time in formally, informally working 
time and leisure and by parameters set of opportunities, constraints (budget + time) - compromise. 
Recent research highlighted that institutions are one of the determinants of the shadow economy 
alongside the tax burden, tax morality and corruption. Better institutions are associated with the rule of law, 
clearer regulations, diminished corruption, lower inflation, higher incomes resulting from taxation and, not 
ultimately, reduced involvement in illicit activities. 
Negative relationship between the degree of direct democracy and size of the underground economy 
suggests the need to involve taxpayers, politicians and specialists in lawmaking and making fiscal and socio-
economic decisions. 
Underground economy cannot be fully understood in the absence of complex connections with 
noneconomic or quasi-economic influencers. This study is intended to constitute a plea for reconsidering the role 
quasi-economic factors as influencing factors of underground economy. 
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